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Association between market
concentration of hospitals and patient
health gain following hip replacement
surgery
Yan Feng1, Michele Pistollato2, Anita Charlesworth3,
Nancy Devlin4, Carol Propper5,6 and Jon Sussex7
Abstract
Objectives: To assess the association between market concentration of hospitals (as a proxy for competition) and
patient-reported health gains after elective primary hip replacement surgery.
Methods: Patient Reported Outcome Measures data linked to NHS Hospital Episode Statistics in England in 2011/12
were used to analyse the association between market concentration of hospitals measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) and health gains for 337 hospitals.
Results: The association between market concentration and patient gain in health status measured by the change in
Oxford Hip Score (OHS) after primary hip replacement surgery was not statistically significant at the 5% level both for
the average patient and for those with more than average severity of hip disease (OHS worse than average). For 12,583
(49.1%) patients with an OHS before hip replacement surgery better than the mean, a one standard deviation increase
in the HHI, equivalent to a reduction of about one hospital in the local market, was associated with a 0.104 decrease in
patients’ self-reported improvement in OHS after surgery, but this was not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Conclusions: Hospital market concentration (as a proxy for competition) appears to have no significant influence (at
the 5% level) on the outcome of elective primary hip replacement. The generalizability of this finding needs to be
investigated.
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Introduction
Health care reforms in England during the last decade
have been inﬂuenced by the idea that encouraging com-
petition between hospitals, with nationally ﬁxed prices,
will increase the quality of care for patients. However,
the eﬀect of competition on health care quality is con-
troversial.1 It is not possible to measure competition
directly. Research in health care and other sectors
uses market concentration as a proxy for competition.
Two empirical studies using national hospital adminis-
trative data from the National Health Service (NHS) in
England suggested that the less the concentration of
hospitals (more competition), the better the quality of
care under a ﬁxed price regime.2,3 Hospital quality, as
measured by 30-day mortality after acute myocardial
infarction (AMI), improved after the choice-based
reforms were introduced in 2006 in less concentrated
markets. However, in those studies,2–4 the methodology
used has been challenged as have the assumptions.5
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Bevan and Skellern also highlight the methodological
challenges, arguing that ‘more research is required
before conclusions can be drawn about the eﬀect of
recent reforms on hospital quality’.6
A principal criticism of existing empirical studies
relates to the measure of quality of care7,8 which used
AMI mortality rates as a proxy for overall hospital
quality. Mortality rates will not capture small changes
in patient health and ignore much hospital care which is
directed at improving patients’ quality of life. Gravelle
et al. examined the correlation between 16 hospital
quality measures and their association with diﬀerent
measures of concentration.9 Their results suggest that
the association between quality and concentration
varies between measures and that correlations between
diﬀerent measures of quality within a hospital are
weak. Furthermore, there are concerns about the ade-
quacy of measurement of patients’ severity of illness
before treatment in earlier studies and hence of
the health gains achieved by treatment. Severity of a
patient’s ill-health before treatment has typically
been measured using proxies such as number of co-
morbidities and of previous emergency admissions
rather than directly. Use of such proxies raises concern
about the accuracy of adjustments for severity.
A more direct way of assessing improvements in
patients’ health, including quality of life, is now avail-
able for some treatments. Since April 2009, English
NHS hospital trusts and independent sector providers
treating NHS-funded patients have collected Patient
Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) data for four
elective surgical procedures: hip replacement, knee
replacement, varicose veins surgery and groin hernia
surgery. A PROM is a set of questions that patients
are asked about their views on their own health.
Questionnaires are completed by patients shortly
before, and 3 or 6 months after surgery. PROMs can
be used to assess directly the quality of speciﬁc inter-
ventions. In addition, PROMs reported before an inter-
vention indicate the severity of the patient’s ill-health.
In this study, we use the newly available PROMs
data to examine the relationship between hospital
market concentration and changes in patients’ self-
reported health following surgery. We hypothesize
that hospitals located in less-concentrated areas (i.e.
more hospitals and thus more competition) will provide
higher quality of care, which will be reﬂected in greater
improvement in patients’ self-reported health status,
compared to hospitals in more concentrated markets
(i.e. fewer hospitals and less competition). We test
this by comparing diﬀerences in a disease speciﬁc
PROM, the Oxford Hip score (OHS), before and
after surgery for elective primary hip replacement
patients treated at hospitals facing diﬀerent degrees of
local market concentration. The focus on one particular
treatment and a disease-speciﬁc health measure allows
us to control for initial health status and overcome the
criticisms of earlier studies that used AMI mortality as
the measure of quality of care.
Methods
Linked PROMs and HES data
We use linked Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and
PROMs for ﬁnancial year 2011/12 for all English NHS
hospitals and independent sector providers undertaking
NHS-funded elective primary hip replacement surgery.
The ‘sitetret’ variable in HES data was used to identify
hospital site. An observation is deﬁned as one ﬁnished
consultant episode (FCE), which covers the period of
time a patient is under the care of one consultant. All
elective episodes of primary hip replacement were
counted. NHS-funded hospital activity is categorized
by Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), which are
groupings of clinically similar treatments that use
common levels of health care resources.10 We examined
those HRG version 3.5 codes that cover elective pri-
mary hip replacement whether cemented or uncemen-
ted. We selected admission records which had full
information on the patient’s age; sex; ethnicity; a meas-
ure of the local area deprivation of the small area in
which the patient lives (Index of Multiple Deprivation
(IMD04)); an indicator of rural or urban location;
patient-reported disability; patient-reported comorbid-
ities11,12 in circulatory disease, liver disease, cancer,
depression, heart disease, high blood pressure, stroke,
lung disease, diabetes, kidney disease, nervous system
disease and arthritis; previous similar surgery; add-
itional hip procedures; duration of symptoms; living
arrangement; EuroQol-Visual Analogue Scale (EQ-
VAS) before treatment; and the OHS before and after
treatment. The hospital characteristics considered were
teaching status and location in Greater London. Other
hospital characteristics were excluded as they were
highly correlated with the measure of hospital concen-
tration we used.
The mean OHS before treatment was 17.79 (on a
scale of 0–48 in which a lower OHS score indicates a
more severe hip condition). We categorized each FCE
into one of two patient groups: less severe (with OHS
before treatment of 18 or more) and more severe (with
OHS before treatment less than 18). The linked HES
and PROMs dataset contained 41,590 observations.
We excluded 15,952 (38.4%) due to missing or invalid
information on one or more variable. Our ﬁnal sample
contains 25,638 observations from 337 hospitals, com-
prising 215 NHS hospitals (belonging to 140 NHS
trusts) and 122 independent sector providers (belonging
to 12 private provider chains).
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Main outcome measure
The PROMs available for hip patients include a condi-
tion-speciﬁc instrument (OHS) and a generic instru-
ment (the EQ-5D). Condition-speciﬁc measures are
generally more sensitive to minor changes in a patient’s
health improvement after treatment, so we only used
the OHS.13,14 The OHS includes 12 joint-speciﬁc items
to assess symptoms and function in patients undergo-
ing hip replacement surgery (Appendix 1, available
online).15 Each is scored from 0 (most severe symp-
toms) to 4 (least or no symptoms). Thus, OHS values
are between 0 (worst hip-related health) and 48 (best
hip-related health). As the dependent variable in our
analysis, we used the change in OHS after surgery to
measure improvement in self-reported patient health.
Market concentration index
Two main measures of hospital market concentration
are used in economics: the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) and the number of alternative providers
in an area.9 We deﬁne each hospital site as a discrete
provider. We used the HHI for each hospital site, cal-
culated from all eligible primary hip replacement epi-
sodes in HES, using the patient ﬂow method to deﬁne
the local market.3 The patient ﬂow method has two
steps. The ﬁrst step measures the level of concentration
in each location, deﬁned as Middle Layer Super Output
Areas (MSOAs). In 2011, there were 7102 MSOAs in
England and Wales, with a mean population of 7800.16
In the second step, the level of concentration for each
hospital is calculated as a weighted average of the
MSOAs it serves where the weights are the share of
the hospital’s patients that live in each MSOA.
We used the HHI because it allows for the relative
sizes of diﬀerent providers as well as their number and
it is used widely in competition policy and literature on
market power.17 The HHI in each MSOA is calculated
as the sum of squared patient shares across all hospitals
the MSOA sends its residents to for primary hip
replacement surgery. The potential HHI lies in the
range of 0–1, where 1 represents maximum market con-
centration or monopoly.
Statistical analysis
Patients’ health gain was measured by the change in
OHS. We ﬁrst investigated the relationship between
market concentration and patient health gain for all
patients. Gains in patients’ health were modelled as a
function of the HHI, patient characteristics – OHS
before treatment, EQ-VAS before treatment, patients
self-reported disability, patients self-reported comor-
bidities, previous surgery, additional hip procedures,
symptom period, living arrangement, age, sex,
ethnicity, urban/rural indicator, IMD score and hos-
pital characteristics – whether a London hospital and
whether a teaching hospital. We then examine the eﬀect
of market concentration separately for patients whose
hip problem was less severe and was more severe. All
estimates were by random eﬀects method at hospital
site level. Data manipulation and analysis were per-
formed with STATA/MP 12.1.
Results
The distribution of the HHI for NHS-funded primary
hip replacements in 2011–2012 is shown in Figure 1. It
ranges between 0.26 and 0.86, with a mean of 0.55.
Note that the HHI is highly correlated with the
number of providers (correlation coeﬃcient¼0.882).
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.
About 96.80% of patients (24,817/25,638) undergo-
ing elective primary hip replacement surgery and
reporting PROMs before and after surgery, reported
a health gain. The distribution of changes in OHS fol-
lowing surgery is presented in Figure 2. We ﬁrst ana-
lysed the relationship between average health gains at
hospital level and the HHI without adjusting for the
eﬀect of any confounders. Figure 3 uses all 337 hospital
sites and 24,817 FCEs. The circle size shows the
amount of activity (number of FCEs) at each hospital.
This shows that the more concentrated the market, the
smaller the health gain from hip surgery, though the
unadjusted slope is slight.
The second column of Table 2 shows the results
from the baseline model. It models patients’ health
gains without adjusting for any patient or hospital
characteristics. There is a statistically insigniﬁcant
negative association between patient health gain and
market concentration.
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Figure 1. Distribution of market concentration of hospitals
(n¼ 337) according to Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable names Mean SD Min Max
Change in OHS after treatment 20.66 9.97 –32 46
OHS before treatment 17.79 8.14 0 48
OHS after treatment 38.45 9.13 0 48
HHI 0.55 0.13 0.26 0.86
Number of competitors 3.28 0.72 1.92 6.32
Patients characteristics
IMD score 2004 17.74 13.00 0.53 87.80
Age in 2011 68.38 10.56 13 100
EQ-VAS before treatment 64.78 21.45 0 100
Sex (men) 40.52%
Ethnicity (British white) 95.87%
Previous surgery 3.04%
Disability before treatment 39.66%
Living arrangements
With partner/spouse/family/
friends
73.81%
Alone 25.65%
Nursing home, hospital or other
long-term care home
0.15%
Other 0.39%
Symptom period
Less than 1 year 13.84%
1 to 5 years 68.82%
6 to 10 years 10.68%
More than 10 years 6.66%
Comorbidity
Circulation disease 6.15%
Liver disease 0.51%
Cancer 4.76%
Depression 7.59%
Heart disease 10.15%
High blood pressure 40.67%
Stroke disease 1.40%
Lung disease 7.72%
Diabetes 9.05%
Kidney disease 1.65%
Nervous system 0.67%
Arthritis 74.13%
Rural/urban indicator
Fraction urban (sparse) 0.31%
Fraction town and fringe (sparse) 0.89%
Fraction village (sparse) 1.03%
Fraction hamlet and Isolated
dwelling (sparse)
0.74%
Fraction urban (less sparse) 70.72%
Fraction town and Fringe (less
sparse)
11.87%
(continued)
Table 1. Continued.
Variable names Mean SD Min Max
Fraction village (less sparse) 10.02%
Fraction hamlet and Isolated
dwelling (less sparse)
4.42%
Hospital characteristics
London hospital 6.95%
Teaching hospital 16.19%
Observations 25,638
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Figure 3. The relationship between HHI and the average
unadjusted change of Oxford Hip Score for all patients for 337
hospitals.
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Figure 2. Distribution of the changes in Oxford Hip Scores
following treatment (n¼ 25,638).
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Table 2. Modelling the change in Oxford Hip Score after hip replacement surgery.
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Variables
Baseline model
(p-value)
Less healthy patients
(p-value)
Healthier patients
(p-value)
Full model
(p-value)
HHI 0.94* (0.05) 0.13 (0.88) 0.80* (0.09) 0.12 (0.76)
OHS before 0.65** (0.00) 0.88** (0.00) 0.77** (0.00)
EQ-VAS before 0.04** (0.00) 0.04** (0.00) 0.04** (0.00)
Previous surgery 2.04** (0.00) 0.40 (0.28) 1.35** (0.00)
Disability 2.70** (0.00) 1.58** (0.00) 2.08** (0.00)
Living arrangement (living with partner/
spouse/family/friends as baseline)
Alone 0.40** (0.04) 0.00 (0.98) 0.21* (0.09)
Long-term care home 1.06 (0.57) 1.26 (0.49) 0.07 (0.96)
Other 2.16* (0.09) 1.01 (0.31) 0.65 (0.42)
Symptom period (less than 1 year as baseline)
1–5 years 0.96** (0.00) 0.31* (0.09) 0.64** (0.00)
6–10 years 2.44** (0.00) 0.35 (0.16) 1.38** (0.00)
More than 10 years 2.25** (0.00) 0.53* (0.08) 1.49** (0.00)
Comorbidity (12 diseases)
Circulation disease 3.27** (0.00) 3.49** (0.00) 3.49** (0.00)
Liver disease 1.12 (0.28) 0.53 (0.58) 0.43 (0.55)
Cancer 0.84** (0.02) 0.17 (0.56) 0.54** (0.02)
Depression 2.26** (0.00) 1.91** (0.00) 2.25** (0.00)
Heart disease 0.68** (0.01) 0.83** (0.00) 0.82** (0.00)
High BP 0.12 (0.47) 0.38** (0.00) 0.23** (0.03)
Stroke disease 1.54** (0.01) 1.41** (0.02) 1.53** (0.00)
Lung disease 1.01** (0.00) 0.69** (0.01) 0.95**(0.00)
Diabetes 1.44** (0.00) 0.71** (0.00) 1.17** (0.00)
Kidney disease 0.11 (0.84) 0.04 (0.95) 0.12 (0.77)
Nervous system 0.88 (0.29) 0.59 (0.55) 0.52 (0.40)
Arthritis 0.73** (0.00) 0.31** (0.02) 0.51** (0.00)
Rural urban indicator (urban sparse as baseline)
Town and fringe (sparse) 1.29 (0.46) 1.94 (0.12) 1.72 (0.11)
Village (sparse) 2.05 (0.23) 3.00** (0.01) 2.56** (0.01)
Hamlet and Isolated dwelling (sparse) 1.75 (0.33) 3.46** (0.01) 2.74** (0.01)
Urban (less sparse) 0.37 (0.81) 1.85* (0.09) 0.78 (0.39)
Town and Fringe (less sparse) 0.26 (0.87) 1.98* (0.07) 0.94 (0.31)
Village (less sparse) 1.04 (0.49) 2.48** (0.02) 1.80* (0.05)
Hamlet and Isolated dwelling (less sparse) 0.54 (0.73) 2.96** (0.01) 1.86** (0.05)
Index of deprivation 0.07** (0.00) 0.06** (0.00) 0.07** (0.00)
Sex (men as baseline) 0.84** (0.00) 0.87** (0.00) 0.86** (0.00)
Ethnicity (British white as baseline) 1.04** (0.01) 0.55* (0.09) 0.91** (0.00)
Patient age 0.03** (0.00) 0.05** (0.00) 0.04** (0.00)
London hospitals 1.08** (0.01) 0.03 (0.89) 0.42** (0.04)
Teaching hospitals 0.17 (0.55) 0.09 (0.58) 0.01 (0.97)
Constant 21.18** (0.00) 25.09** (0.00) 31.03** (0.00) 26.86** (0.00)
R-squared 0.0001 0.138 0.320 0.336
Observations 25,638 13,055 12,583 25,638
Note: All models estimated with random effects.
*p< 0.10.
**p< 0.05.
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Columns 3–5 of Table 2 present the results from
modelling the health gains adjusted for patient and hos-
pital characteristics. Column 5 shows the results if all
patients are included. This shows no statistically signiﬁ-
cant association between patients’ health gain and hos-
pital market concentration when patient and hospital
characteristics are allowed for. We then ran regressions
for the two subgroups of patients based on pre-opera-
tive severity. The results in column 3 show no signiﬁ-
cant association between patients’ health gain and
market concentration for less healthy patients. But for
12,583 (49.1% of the sample) healthier patients the
results in column 4 show a small negative association
between market concentration and health gain, though
this was not statistically signiﬁcant at p< 0.05. A one
standard deviation increase in HHI (equivalent to a
decrease of about one hospital in each local market)
was associated with a 0.010 (¼0.13 (0.80)/9.97)
standard deviation lower OHS gain or 0.104
(¼0.13 (0.80)) less OHS gain.
Discussion
Main findings
The key ﬁnding from this study is that we found no
statistically signiﬁcant association (at the 5% level)
between hospital market concentration and the
improvement in health of hip patients after surgery.
For less severe hip patients, there is a small negative
association between hospital market concentration and
their health gains after treatment but this is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We intend to reinves-
tigate this relationship when data from later years
become available. Our p-value (p¼ 0.09) is not small
enough to justify rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e.
no eﬀect of hospital market concentration. Thus we did
not ﬁnd strong evidence that hospital market concen-
tration has an eﬀect on less severe patients’ health gains
after treatment.
Limitations
We excluded 5320 (17.2%) observations from the ana-
lysis because of a missing OHS value before or after
treatment. The majority (5131) were due to patients
who did not return their post-operative OHS question-
naires despite completing pre-operative questionnaires.
Only 48 were missing both pre- and post-operative
OHS questionnaires and 141 were missing pre-opera-
tive OHS questionnaires but not post-operative. The
missing observations could be systematically related
to some patient characteristics and/or hospital charac-
teristics. This would lead to biased estimates although
the size and direction of the bias are not clear.
We included a rich set of patient and hospital char-
acteristics in the model. However, the results could still
be biased as the result of other potential confounding
patient and hospital variables in the cross-sectional
analysis. The size and direction of the bias are not
clear in the model with more than two variables.18,19
In principle, we might try to deal missing confoun-
ders in two ways. First, we could look for an exogenous
variable as the proxy for market concentration. In the
present case, there is no obvious instrument. Second,
we could run a ﬁxed eﬀects model at hospital level with
more than one year’s data. However, we could not do a
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerence analysis because of the nature
of the way that PROMs data were collected, i.e. it does
not provide information about a control group.
Conclusion
Hospital market concentration (as a proxy for compe-
tition) appears to have no signiﬁcant (at the 5% level)
inﬂuence on the outcome of elective primary hip
replacement. The generalizability of this ﬁnding needs
to be investigated.
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